<p>The second Schweinfurt mission cost the Eighth 600 men and 60 bombers; 17 more B-17s were scrapped, and 121 were damaged and needed major work. The Germans paid 38 fighters for that particular victory, although the bomber gunners claimed 186 destroyed.
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<p>It was the end of clear-weather deep penetrations of German air space for the rest of the year. The Luftwaffe now held undisputed control of the daylight skies over Germany. There was more to the October crisis. The continued bombing effort of the combined forces of the USAAF and the RAF was not decimating German aircraft deliveries, nor destroying the German morale. In retrospect, we know why.
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<p>First, German production capacity had been underestimated consistently, by as much as 30 per cent in the case of fighters. Second, the claims of German aircraft destroyed by bomber gunners were consistently exaggerated. Third, the need for repeated attacks against a single target complex within a short time span was not appreciated.
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<p>The strength was available, it seemed; Eighth AF had a daily average of nearly 900 bombers and 650 crews on hand. But during September and October, the maximum number of planes over the targets never exceeded 360, and Germany was bombed only once in September.
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<p>Part of the problem was the weather, which often was responsible for cancelling planned strikes just before scheduled takeoff. Another reason was an operation codenamed Starkey, a combined British and American attack on the Pas de Calais area. It drew off 683 sorties by VIII BC during August and September, almost one-third of the total flown during those months.
